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Nonsense	Aesthetics:	(Imaginary)	Living	After	the	Death	of	Falsity		
From	the	late	17th	to	the	mid-18th	Century	in	Europe,	scientists	and	citizens	alike	believed	
that	an	element	called	phlogiston	was	contained	within	flammable	substances	[1].	This	
theory	explained	a	number	of	diverse	observations,	including	the	presence	of	flames	(taken	
to	be	the	emerging	phlogiston),	the	powdery	nature	of	ash	(because	a	solid	object	would	
crumble	when	it	lost	its	phlogiston),	and	processes	like	smelting	(which	would	work	by	
transferring	phlogiston).	In	short,	phlogiston	theory	postulated	what	we	might	now	call	a	
"negative	oxygen,"	where	understanding	combustion	as	a	gain	of	oxygen	(as	we	now	
commonly	do)	is	logically	equivalent	to	understanding	it	as	a	loss	of	phlogiston,	such	that	
"any	chemical	reaction	that	involves	the	transfer	of	oxygen	[could]	equally	be	viewed	as	a	
transfer	of	phlogiston	in	the	opposite	direction"	[2].	The	catch—which	ultimately	
obsolesced	the	theory—is	that	chemists	realized	that	for	phlogiston	to	exist	it	would	have	
to	have	a	negative	mass,	which	is	physically	impossible.		
	 But	what	if	we	weren't	quite	satisfied	with	physical	impossibility	as	grounds	for	
dismissal?	That	is,	what	if	we	took	this	physical	impossibility	not	as	a	cue	to	look	to	another	
explanation,	but	rather	as	a	method	of	sustaining	and	focusing	the	imaginative	possibility	
that	underwrites	impossibility,	as	well	as	the	impossibility	that	underwrites	possibility	
itself?	In	short,	what	if	we	recalibrated	the	(humanist)	injunction	to	mean	away	from	the	
goal	of	understanding	what	is	possible	and	towards	the	goal	of	imagining	new	
impossibilities?	Instead	of	debunking	phlogiston	in	the	name	of	what	is	already	known,	we	
might	instead	come	to	bear	on	the	precise	ways	in	which	knowledge	is	always	
simultaneously	a	form	of	not-knowing.	Moreover,	we	might	take	seriously	the	possibility	
		
that	it	is	this	negative	knowledge—these	delusions—that	"maintain	the	integrity	of	the	
question[s]"	we	ask	in	and	through	our	daily	lives	[3].	
Asking	these	questions	in	this	way—and	asking	them	in	the	context	of	"the	death	of	
falsity"	[4]	that	accompanies	postmodernism's	death	of	truth—seeks	to	replace	the	horizon	
of	truth	with	"a	horizon	of	imaginative	possibility"	[5].	Such	is	precisely	the	impulse	behind	
In	Praise	of	Nonsense,	Ted	Hiebert's	vertigo-inducing	meditation	on	nonsense	as	a	lived	
vector	of	quotidian	postmodernism.	Hiebert's	pursuit	of	this	horizon—executed	through	
encounters	with	philosophers,	artists,	and	technologists	alike—moves	always	in	two	
directions	simultaneously:	on	one	hand,	Hiebert	follows	Wittgenstein	in	the	critical	
enterprise	of	demonstrating	that	"behind	every	well-founded	belief	lies	belief	that	is	not	
founded"	[6].	In	this,	Hiebert	contributes	to	an	ever-proliferating	body	of	literature	(found	
across	disciplines)	that	deals	with	the	performativity	of	knowledge:	for	Hiebert	(following	
Foucault,	among	others),	knowledge	is	not	so	much	a	revelation	of	what	is	objectively	true,	
but	is	instead	an	iterative,	dispersed,	and	ongoing	activity	of	maintaining	the	status	quo.	
The	task	of	the	critic,	then,	becomes	one	of	identifying	the	particular	contingencies	of	a	
situation	that	allow	it	to	adopt	the	appearance	of	truth,	as	well	as	the	excluded-inclusions	
that	persistently	trouble	the	boundaries	of	such	appearances.	While	Hiebert's	efforts	in	this	
respect	are	admirable	and	insightful,	more	remarkable	is	the	second,	twinned	vector	of	his	
inquiry,	which	moves	towards	refashioning	understanding	"such	that	it	is	made	to	resonate	
with	our	own	imagined	or	imaginary	experiences"	[7].	As	he	notes,	if	Wittgenstein's	
formulation	is	correct,	the	fact	that	the	formulation	itself	is	"grounded	as	non-founded	is	
nothing	less	than	a	possibility	for	nonsense	that	is	nevertheless	'praised	into'	existence—
rendered	in	terms	of	imaginary	plausibility	rather	than	argumentative	demonstration"	[8].	
		
In	this	respect,	In	Praise	of	Nonsense	doesn't	just	expose	contingency,	but	actually	leverages	
the	most	radical	senses	of	the	term	in	order	to	formulate	an	aesthetic	strategy	towards—as	
opposed	to	a	logical	description	of—postmodern	culture.		
Indeed,	this	disposition	towards	imaginary	plausibility	aptly	characterizes	the	tone	
of	In	Praise	of	Nonsense	in	general,	which	frequently	hinges	(at	the	local	level)	on	a	rhetoric	
of	inversion.	Thus,	as	examples,	we	are	asked	to	consider	not	only	the	illogic	that	
underwrites	Wittgenstein's	formulation	of	logic	as	illogical,	but	are	also	invited	to	reverse	
"Foucault’s	idea	of	thought	as	‘the	presence	of	someone	else	in	me’"	[9],	and	to	turn	the	
psychoanalytic	mirror	back	on	Lacan.	In	fact,	these	flips	are	so	prevalent	in	the	book	that	
one	begins	to	perform	them	in	advance	of	their	appearance	in	the	text,	such	that	one	hears	
in	every	statement	and	description	its	negative	image	even	before	it	is	conjured	by	
Hiebert’s	argument;	in	every	case,	though,	the	gambit	is	not	only	to	show	how	the	
perspective	is	subject	to	its	own	perspectival	biases,	but	also	to	show	how	this	very	
contingency	constitutes	experience	as	an	aesthetic	concern.		
In	order	to	engage	this	lived	aesthetic,	Hiebert	argues	that	the	postmodern	self	is	
technologized	along	a	combination	of	three	vectors.	The	first	of	these	are	technologies	of	
disappearance,	which	Hiebert	describes	as	"intellectual	and	psychological	devices	that	one	
can	use	to	construct	a	plausible	picture	of	not-being,	progressively	writing	out	the	residual	
elements	of	self	and	identity	in	such	a	way	as	to	re-open	the	questions	of	possibility"	[10]	
Included	in	this	category—this	aesthetics	of	living—are	the	technologies	of	reflection,	
perception,	and	autopoiesis,	all	of	which	are	implicated	in	subject-formation	and	each	of	
which	occasion	engagement	by	Hiebert	with	prominent	theorists	[11].	Crucially,	Hiebert's	
understanding	of	disappearance	in	general	recalls	McLuhan's	notion	of	obsolescence:	just	
		
as	an	obsolesced	technology	doesn't	cease	to	exist	but	rather	persists	in	new	forms—and	
hence	obsolescence	is	"the	beginning	of	aesthetics,	the	cradle	of	taste,	of	art,	of	eloquence,	
and	of	slang"	[12]—the	disappearance	of	knowledge	is	not	an	absence	but	a	mode	of	living,	
a	"lived	disappearance"	[13].	Thus,	"what	remains	when	knowledge	disappears	is	an	
experience	without	knowledge	[that]	nevertheless	takes	form,	[…]	paradoxical	though	it	
might	be"	[14].		
This,	then,	is	the	second	technological	trope	that	gains	prominence	in	postmodern	
culture:	Hiebert	nominates	the	term	“technologies	of	ironic	appearance”	as	a	means	of	
characterizing	the	myriad	"modes	of	prioritizing	the	masquerade	of	falsity	over	the	
domination	of	truth"	[15]	demonstrating	the	numerous	ways	in	which	"the	performance	of	
disappearance	always	contains	a	trace	of	irony,	a	self-reflexive	relationship	to	the	paradox	
of	its	own	impossibility"	[16].	Readings	of	Barthes,	Zizek,	and	Bakhtin	play	an	animating	
role	in	this	section	of	the	book,	with	each	adding	a	conceptual	card	to	the	house	that	
Hiebert	builds…an	architecture	that	is	all	the	more	potent	for	its	fragility—for	the	fact	that	
it	is	built	on	allusions,	slippery	metaphors,	and	rhetorical	reversals	as	much	as	linear	
reasoning—as	(again)	Hiebert	is	explicitly	engaged	in	an	exercise	of	“thought	as	
incantation”	[17]	in	response	to	a	culture	of	ubiquitous	logical	indeterminacy.	
For	Hiebert's	argument,	then,	the	final	step	is	to	ask	after	the	"possibilities	for	
inauthentic	engagement	to	be	non-ironic"	[18],	to	engage	a	"mode	of	living	with	
uncertainty	that	would	no	longer	be	simply	the	attempt	to	self-contextualize	as	a	function	
of	contingencies	of	disappearance,	but	to	instead	begin	re-mapping	uncertainty	itself"	[19].	
Hiebert	calls	the	various	means	of	achieving	this	“technologies	of	delirious	appearance,”	a	
term	that	explicitly	reverses	"the	terminologies	of	sensical	apparition	in	favor	of	the	
		
delirious	possibilities	of	livable	un-reason"	[20].	Here	again	then,	performativity	and	
aesthetics	combine	to	play	an	animating	role	in	forming	the	question:	“how	to	maintain	a	
form	of	thinking	that	no	longer	has	a	well-grounded	basis?”	[21]	To	this	end,	Hiebert	moves	
from	knowledge	to	conviction,	where	the	latter	is	a	lived	aesthetic	practice;	one	can	be	
mistakenly	convinced,	after	all,	but	“one's	conviction	need	not	be	lesser	for	the	mistake”	
[22].	
Fittingly	(given	the	book’s	emphasis	on	specifically	lived	disappearance),	
underwriting	this	larger	technological	narrative	in	the	book	is	an	implicit	emphasis	on	a	
term	that	only	appears	on	a	few	occasions:	embodiment.	And	yet,	vectors	of	embodiment	
palpate	the	text’s	stated	subjects	continuously;	indeed,	Hiebert	states	early	on	in	the	text	
that	his	goal	is	to	“formulate	an	embodied	'illogic'	which	might	be	translated	into	plausible	
methodologies	of	interaction	with	(and	within)	an	increasingly	uncertain	philosophical	
world”	[23].	In	what,	then,	does	this	embodiment	consist?		
	 There	is,	first	of	all,	the	by	now	familiar	insistence	on	the	difference	between	
embodiment	and	“the	body,”	a	distinction	that	Katherine	Hayles	eloquently	charts	by	
arguing	(in	the	context	of	a	critique	of	Foucault)	that	“the	body	is	always	normative	relative	
to	some	set	of	criteria”	while	“embodiment	is	the	specific	instantiation	generated	from	the	
noise	of	difference”	[24].	Hiebert,	though,	takes	this	observation	a	step	further:	motivated	
by	the	observation	that	“difference	becomes	the	common	denominator	for	a	theory	of	
meta-sameness”	[25]	when	all	perspectives	are	acknowledged	as	different,	he	argues	that	
embodied	subjectivity	results	from	incommensurability	instead	of	the	other	way	around	
[26].	That	is,	the	oft-remarked	incommensurability	of	subjectivity	is	simulated,	not	in	the	
name	of	a	unified	subject	but	rather	as	the	condition	of	appearance—where	to	appear	is	
		
always	to	appear	as	something—of	a	pre-existent	absence	(i.e.	a	technology	of	
disappearance).	In	short,	“if	there	is	nothing	to	which	subjective	experience	can	be	
compared,	then	‘somethingness’	can	only	ever	by	the	prosthetic	aura	of	an	
incommensurable	‘nothingness’”	[27].		
	 What	Hiebert	sustains,	then,	is	a	theory	of	a	kind	of	post-differential	difference	
towards	an	“explicit	reversal	of	the	terminologies	of	sensical	apparition	in	favour	of	the	
delirious	possibilities	of	livable	unreason”	[28].	In	this	way,	embodiment	and	subjectivity	
are	conflated	along	the	lines	of	lived	experience	so	that,	here	again,	contemporary	
conversations	regarding	embodiment	are	turned	on	their	heads.	The	“postmodern	identity”	
of	the	book’s	title,	for	example,	bears	little	resemblance	to	the	stochastic	processes	that	
often	characterize	identity	politics.	Instead,	Hiebert	gives	us	“autonomic	personalities”	as	a	
way	of	embracing	the	contingency	of	lived	contexts.	That	is,	for	Hiebert	“autonomic	
trajectories—habits—	are	not	necessarily	the	enemy	of	subjectivity	[but]	instead	can	be	
seen	as	that	which	allows	one	to	autonomically	proceed	along	various	personality	paths	
while	still	being	disciplined	into	new	ones”	[29].	Importantly,	Hiebert	argues	that	this	
understanding	resituates	the	unconscious	(which	works	of	its	own	accord)	as	a	
“consciously	rendered	unconscious-machine”	[30],	losing	its	primacy	over	subjectivity	to	
become	one	(lived	and	imaginary)	habit	among	many.		
All	of	this	is	to	make	of	embodied	subjectivity	a	theory	of	media,	and	moreover	one	
wherein	causality	itself	is	captured	in	advance	by	its	medial	appearance.	When	the	rug	is	
pulled	out	from	under	the	rug	of	experience,	causality	itself	becomes	“a	function	of	
perspectival	assemblage	[…]—a	delirious	proposition	of	contingency	rather	than	a	
legitimizing	structure	of	logic”	[31].	This	is,	of	course,	the	condition	of	postmodernity	writ	
		
large,	but	Hiebert	shows	how	this	combines	with	McLuhan’s	media	theory	to	situate	the	
postmodern	self	as	a	“deferred	fantasy	of	itself	as	another”	[32].	Simply	put,	if	McLuhan	is	
correct	both	that	“‘the	medium	is	the	message’	and	at	the	same	time	[that]	‘the	content	of	
any	medium	is	always	another	medium,’”	[this	implies	that	the]	content	of	a	medium	is	
always	deferred	[…and…]	the	self,	as	a	medium	of	messages,	always	has	its	content	in	a	
deferred	fantasy	of	itself	as	another	medium”	[33].		
This	is	not,	however,	to	undermine	the	medial	specificity	of	these	appearances,	and	
Hiebert	notes	the	specific	affordances	that	come	with	moving	from	technologies	of	
reflection	to	that	of	the	screen	in	our	approach	to	selfhood.	Specifically,	he	suggests	that	in	
the	screen	“one	finds	for	perhaps	the	first	time	the	possibility	of	a	non-traumatized	image,	
an	image	that	is	capable	of	rendering	fantasy	for	the	simple	reason	that	it	never	pretended	
to	be	real”	[34].	This	is	a	crucial	insight	because	if	it	was	the	body	that	was	the	implied	
content	of	the	reflected	image,	“it	is	the	reflected	body	(and	not	the	biological	body	proper)	
that	is	the	content	of	the	projected	self”	[35].	In	contemporary	technical	culture,	then,	
Hiebert	finds	(echoing	Baudrillard,	in	this	respect)	the	conditions	for	acting	on	
appearances	in	their	own	right,	for	incanting	reality’s	(or	realities’?)	hallucinatory	vectors.	
Indeed,	I	will	be	interested	to	see	how	this	text	itself	might	act	out	its	claims	as	it	is	
deployed	across	various	settings.	Being	published	by	a	distinguished	University	press,	one	
expects	that	it	(or	sections	of	it)	will	appear	on	syllabi,	where	it	will	circulate	according	to	
the	rhythms	and	demands	of	the	University	knowledge	economy.	One	hopes	that	the	text’s	
autopoietic	impulse—its	constitution	of	itself	as	an	incantation	of	itself,	rather	than	as	an	
object	of	study—might	frustrate	professor’s	and	student’s	institutionally	disciplined	
autonomic	wills	to	extract	and	exchange	arguments	as	quantifiable	and	verifiable	currency;	
		
one	hopes,	that	is,	that	the	extremity	of	its	speculation—in	the	absence	of	the	gold	standard	
of	linear	reasoning—might	catalyze	at	least	a	local	economic	collapse	in	University	
classrooms.	That	is,	precisely	because	the	text	isn’t	a	particularly	“teachable”	one,	it	may	
leave	one	in	a	position	to	learn.		
Indeed,	I	myself	have	been	caught	in	this	same	dilemma,	which	might	be	
characterized	as	the	hyperlocalization	that	comes	with	knowing	through	hallucination.	In	
my	case,	I	find	myself	having	reached	the	end	of	this	review	essay	without	having	discussed	
what,	to	my	mind,	is	the	most	compelling	part	of	In	Praise	of	Nonsense,	namely	the	
remarkable	readings	of	artworks	that	are	offered	at	the	beginning	of	each	chapter.	In	each	
case,	Hiebert	“praises”	a	non-canonic	artwork	into	existence	for	the	reader,	but	in	such	a	
way	that	one	can’t	quite	hold	it.	That	is,	I	might	be	convinced,	moved,	and	otherwise	incited	
towards	autonomic	affective	responses	by	a	reading,	but	it	never	allows	me	to	make	a	
demonstration	of	the	artwork,	to	extract	the	artwork	(or	the	reading	of	it)	from	the	local	
instance	of	the	text	(or,	more	specifically,	from	the	local	instance	of	reading	the	text).	To	be	
clear,	this	is	not	a	deficit	of	the	book,	but	rather	a	clear	demonstration	of	the	
performative—or	perhaps	even	ritualized—aspect	of	reading	it:	to	praise	nonsense	in	the	
sense	that	Hiebert	advocates	is	always	a	“praising	with”	Hiebert	wherein	Hiebert,	the	
subject	at	hand,	and	oneself	as	reader	are	all	lost	to	a	lived	disappearance.	In	short,	we	are	
all	“performed,”	in	the	precise	sense	that	the	term	indicates	an	unassimilable	supplement	
to	every	constative	claim.	In	Praise	of	Nonsense	acts,	then,	perhaps	as	a	kind	of	discursive	
phlogiston,	a	negative	image	of	communication	for	a	world	where	imagination	is	produced	
instead	of	knowledge	being	consumed,	even	if	the	former	continually	floats	away	under	the	
weight	of	its	own	negative	mass.		
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